Background. Since 2014, 17 human cases of infection with the newly emerged highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N6) virus have been identified in China to date. The epidemiologic characteristics of laboratory-confirmed A(H5N6) cases were compared to A(H5N1) and A(H7N9) cases in mainland China.
total of 17 confirmed cases, 12 of which were reported in 2016. Here we assessed the epidemiologic characteristics of laboratory-confirmed human cases of HPAI A(H5N6) virus infection in mainland China, compared to confirmed cases of HPAI A(H5N1) and LPAI A(H7N9) virus infections in mainland China.
METHODS

Sources of Data
In China, all laboratory-confirmed cases of human infection with H7N9 and H5N1 viruses are reported to the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention (China CDC) through a national system. Information on cases of human infection with H5N6 virus was obtained through field epidemiological investigations conducted by local provincial CDCs and literature review. We used standard forms to collect demographic, epidemiological, and basic clinical data for patients with confirmed cases of H5N6, H7N9, or H5N1 virus infections. We collected detailed epidemiological information on laboratory-confirmed H5N6, H7N9, and H5N1 cases reported as of 30 November 2016. In the current analysis, we used data on age, sex, place of residence, symptoms at illness onset, and underlying medical disorders associated with an increased risk of seasonal influenza complications; dates of illness onset, hospital admission, death or discharge; and dates of potential exposures to domestic or retail animals, visits to live poultry markets; and clinical presentation, diagnosis, and treatment. Recent exposure history to poultry including at live poultry markets and to backyard poultry during the ten days prior to illness onset were recorded through an interview with the patient or the relative of a patient [10] .
Ethical Approval
Collection and analyses of data from human cases of H5N6, H7N9, and H5N1 virus infections were part of an ongoing public health investigation of emerging outbreaks and thus were exempt from institutional review board assessment in China [10] .
Statistical Analysis
We performed descriptive analyses of confirmed cases of H5N6 in comparison to H5N1 and H7N9 cases, using t-tests and χ 2 tests to compare continuous variables and categorical variables respectively. We plotted the geographical location of H5N6 and H5N1 cases, in comparison to the incidence rates of H7N9 virus infections estimated at a provincial level rather than plotted individually, given the large number of reported H7N9 cases relative to H5N1 or H5N6 cases in China. We fitted parametric distributions to the time from illness onset to hospital admission, illness onset to laboratory confirmation, hospital admission to death, and hospital admission to discharge [10] [11] [12] . We compared alternative parametric distributions, including gamma, Weibull, and lognormal distributions, with non-parametric estimates and selected the best parametric distribution on the basis of the Akaike information criterion [13] . We compared the severity of H5N6, H5N1, and H7N9 cases based on the risk of severe outcomes in hospitalized cases, given that there is likely considerable under-ascertainment of mild, non-hospitalized cases [14, 15] . Specifically, mild cases have been detected through the national influenza-like illness sentinel surveillance network, which covers around 1% of outpatient consultations and only performs laboratory testing on a small fraction of influenza-like illness patients identified in the network [16] . Among hospitalized cases, we estimated the risk of admission to intensive care unit, the risk of requiring mechanical ventilation, and the risk of death, and compared these risks between H5N6, H5N1, and H7N9 cases.
Role of the Funding Source
The funding bodies had no role in study design, data collection, data analysis, data interpretation, or writing of the manuscript. The corresponding author had full access to all the data in the study and had final responsibility for the decision to submit for publication.
RESULTS
As of 30 November 2016, there were 17 laboratory-confirmed human cases of H5N6, compared to 45 H5N1 cases and 782 H7N9 cases reported in mainland China. H5N6 cases were significantly older and had a higher prevalence of underlying medical conditions than H5N1 cases but were significantly younger than H7N9 cases ( Table 1 ). The sex distributions of H5N6 and H5N1 cases were similar with a largely even involvement of female and male patients, whereas H7N9 cases were more frequently reported in males. There was no difference between the prevalence of underlying medical conditions for H5N6 compared to H7N9 cases. All of the H5N6 cases reported recent exposure to poultry, with a greater (not statistically significant) frequency of recent visits to live poultry markets than for H5N1 or H7N9 cases. (Table 1) . Figure 1 shows the geographic distribution of H5N6, H5N1, and H7N9 cases. The H5N6 cases have been identified in south and southwest China, whereas the H5N1 cases have occurred more sporadically across a broader part of the country. As previously noted, the incidence rate of H7N9 cases has been higher in eastern and southern China, where the density of live poultry markets is also highest [17] .
The time from symptom onset to hospital admission and the time from onset to laboratory confirmation was similar for cases infected with H5N6, H5N1, and H7N9 viruses (Figure 2A and 2B) . A wide range of duration from hospital admission to death was observed in confirmed cases of infections with the 3 viruses ( Figure 2C ). Among cases that survived, the duration of hospitalization was mostly longer than 2 to 3 weeks, whereas scarce recovery data were available for H5N6 cases ( Figure 2D ). Approximately 88% of H5N6 cases and 73% of H7N9 cases received antiviral treatment, which were higher than for H5N1 cases (58%). The time from illness onset to initiation of antiviral treatment was shorter for H5N6 cases (5 days, median) compared to H7N9 (6 days) and H5N1 cases (7 days) ( Figure 3 ). Six out of 12 H5N6-related deaths occurred within 5 days after hospital admission, and most H5N1 and H7N9 related deaths also had a relatively short duration of hospitalization. Of the 16 hospitalized H5N6 cases, 15 (94%) required mechanical ventilation, 12 cases were fatal, and 3 patients recovered, whereas the outcome of one previously hospitalized patient is unknown. This compares to a fatality risk of 70% (30/43) for hospitalized H5N1 cases, and 41% (319/782) for hospitalized H7N9 cases that were confirmed between March 2013 and November 2016.
DISCUSSION
Human infections with HPAI H5N6 virus are the latest in a series of reported cases of human infections with avian influenza A viruses in China, following HPAI H5N1 virus infections since 2003 [10, 18] , LPAI H7N9 virus infections since 2013 [10, 11, 19, 20] , H10N8 virus infection in 2013 [21] , and LPAI H9N2 virus infections since 1998 [22] . These continued zoonotic events pose a major threat to public health since an avian influenza A virus may be able to acquire mutations that allow for efficient and sustained human-to-human transmission and lead Avian Influenza A(H5N6), A(H5N1) and A(H7N9 to the next influenza pandemic [23] . Avian influenza A viruses including HPAI H5N6 have been detected in free-range poultry and wild birds [24] and more frequently in live poultry markets [24, 25] . The newly emerged HPAI H5N6 virus belonging to the genetic clade 2.3.4.4 of H5 virus subtypes has acquired receptor binding affinity to the human-like SAα2,6Gal-linked receptor, suggesting increased pandemic potential, although HPAI H5N6 virus did not exhibit aerosol transmission and demonstrated relatively lower pathogenicity compared with HPAI H5N1 virus in the ferret model [26] . The sporadic occurrence of human H5N6 cases across southern China is somewhat consistent with the areas of highest poultry density [17] , although poultry density is also high in eastern China around the Yangtze River delta where H5N6 cases have not yet been reported in the current outbreak. Human exposure to live poultry in China is also high in cities in southern China [27] , where there is also a high density of live poultry markets [17] . Fourteen of the H5N6 cases reported recent exposure to live poultry markets (Table 1) . However, there were distinct differences in the characteristics of H5N6 cases compared to H5N1 and H7N9 cases, with H5N6 cases having a mean age somewhat between the younger (on average) H5N1 cases and older (on average) H7N9 cases ( Table 1 ). The majority of H5N6 cases had underlying medical conditions, which was not observed for H5N1 cases (Table 1) .
In terms of the severity of hospitalized cases, 94% of H5N6 cases were admitted into an intensive care unit and required mechanical ventilation, similar to hospitalized H5N1 and H7N9 cases. To date, 12 of the 17 H5N6 cases have been fatal (71%), similar to the fatality risk of H7N9 cases identified early in 2013 [11] and the fatality risk of hospitalized H5N1 cases in mainland China over the past 13 years (70%) [10] . There was a high risk of mortality despite use of oseltamivir in most cases, although often oseltamivir treatment was not given until >5 days after illness onset.
One of the 17 H5N6 cases was detected through the influenza-like illness sentinel surveillance network [28] that covers a small fraction of ambulatory medical consultations in China, suggesting that other cases of mild illness with H5N6 virus infection have likely occurred. Therefore, the number of confirmed human H5N6 cases is likely to be an underestimate of all human H5N6 virus infections that have occurred, similar to the situation for H7N9 virus in China [14] . China CDC established systematic surveillance for pneumonia of unknown etiology in 2004 [29] , and there have been improvements in laboratory surveillance for influenza, particularly since 2009. Given the increasing frequency with which human infections with avian influenza A viruses have been detected in recent years [10, 11, [18] [19] [20] [21] 30] , it is important to determine whether this pattern is purely an artefact of improvements in surveillance, or a truly increasing risk of zoonotic events in addition to improved surveillance in China.
H5N1 vaccination of poultry was introduced in China in 2006 [31] , which was also the year in which the incidence of human H5N1 cases peaked in China [10] . Although H5N1 vaccination of domestic poultry protects against disease associated with H5N1 virus infection, it does not appear to protect against infection and virus shedding in the absence of obvious symptoms [32] . Recent experimental H5N1 vaccine using the HA and NA genes from the 2.3.4.4 genetic clade showed complete protection against virus shedding and disease among chickens challenged with the H5N6 virus that has been causing outbreaks worldwide [33] . This suggests that use of an H5N1 vaccine in poultry could also protect against infection with some strains of genetically related H5 subtypes, including H5N6 viruses, thereby potentially reducing the risk of zoonotic transmission to exposed persons.
There are some limitations of our study. First, our analysis of the epidemiology of H5N6 cases is based on case notifications, and it is possible that some human infections have occurred that were not laboratory-confirmed, for example, because of a lack of clinical suspicion or access to laboratory testing in some areas [10] . Second, only a small number of H5N6 cases have been reported to date, limiting our ability to characterize the differences with other avian influenza A virus infections or the typical illness course with H5N6 virus infection.
In conclusion, we have described the epidemiology of the first 17 laboratory-confirmed human infections with HPAI A(H5N6) virus in China. The laboratory-confirmed H5N6 cases were characterized by severe illness among the 16 hospitalized cases, with a high risk of fatal outcome. It remains to be seen whether HPAI A(H5N6) virus will continue to circulate among poultry and cause sporadic human infections in coming years, as A(H7N9) virus has done for four years. Continued global surveillance of human infections with avian influenza A viruses remains an essential component of pandemic preparedness, and further investigations are needed on the factors contributing to the observed patterns of human infections with avian influenza A viruses. 
